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Abstroct 
Ever since ancient times it has occurred to memy people, great and small, 
that the existence of evil constitutes evidence against that of God. The 
central claim of this thesis is that, contrary to theistic belief, this evidence 
is decisive. 
In the introduction it is argued that all previous attempts to show this 
fact have been unsuccessful. These attempts heve been vitiated by the fellacy 
of supposing that God, as an all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good agent, is 
alweys required to do the best He is capable of doing. Though other 
possi bi 1 it i es remain, this supposition usually manifested itse 1f in arguments 
which claimed that a God of the above mentioned sort cannot exist, because if 
such a being existed, He would have creeled a much better world than the 
actual one. Besides an appeal to God's above mentioned qualities, the sole 
justification offered for this claim usually has been only to po1nt out the fact 
that it was in God's power to actualise a better world than the actual one. 
But this argument is invalid. Given God's quBlities, the mere fact thet the 
creation of a better world was an option to God cannot constitute a sufficient 
reason for Him to take advantage of that option. For, given the fact that there 
is virtually no limit to what a being like God can do, it is true of tll7!J possible 
world which was in God's power to actualise that He could have created a 
better one than it. Consequently, 1f God decided to create, say value, He would 
have to be quite i rrati ona 1 to decide not to create some particular world just 
because it was in His power to create a better one than it. For, if He did that, 
He ultimately would altogether have to forego creating anything at all - which 
is absurd because it cannot be the case that a being 1 i ke God is unab 1 e to 
perform His own will. And this is a problem for atheist endeavours because it 
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shows that the claim that if Gode~~'fsteo.: lie J·vo11/d/Jovecreotedobetter 
J·vorld thon the oc/110/ one inevitably remains unsupported if we proceed from 
this tradftf onal approach. 
The chief nave lty of this thesis 11 es f n showing the way out of this 
particular difficulty. It is argued here that if God existed, He would have 
created a better world than the ectuel one not only because it was in His 
power to do so, but because the actuel world falls to meet e certain adequacy 
threshold of being good eno11g/J fore product of the creative activity of e 
perfect being like God. 
The justification offered for this claim relies on a distinction between 
ends and meons . It goes in two steps: Firstly, it is argued that in God's hands 
the ectuf.ll world could only be a means to an end. And secondly, it is argued 
that whetever God's purpose with the actual world might heve been, on 
account of His benevolence it would heve to be a morally good one. 
Consequently, He could have achieved that purpose by creating a world without 
superfluous, unnecessary evils in it. Failure to do this conflicts with His 
benevolence. 
Further, in defence of this last claim it is argued that although God 
cannot be reasonably required to attempt realizing the best possible moral 
goo/ (for nothing qualifies as such), it conflicts with His benevolence if He 
fails to employ the best possible moral meons available to Him for realizing 
His goals. 
The rest of the thesis contains the details and defence of an argument 
from evil which is advanced within the framework of this new approach. 
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